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Mass privatisation has exerted and is still exerting a very serious and wide-scale impact 
on the restructuring of the national economy. This is spread out not only to the directly 
included enterprises but also to other important institutions of market economy, such as the 
Stock Exchange. This impact is working, through the enormous number of individual 
participants, on the confidence and predisposition of the investors as well as the external 
portfolio investors. Maybe the most serious impact of this influence is the formation of a new 
structure of forms for corporate control in the privatized enterprises (Shleifer & Vishny 
1997).  
This paper1 presents some of the results of a survey of this structure conducted with the 
financial support of the PHARE-ACE program and the Economic Institute of the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences (Tchipev 1997; 1999). The survey uses the classic tradition in the 
treatment of the problem, which starts with the fundamental survey of Berle & Means (1991), 
which states that the means for effective control on the management of the enterprise are 
determined by the scale and the distribution of the shareholders’ participation in its capital. 
Later on this was used as a basis for the development of a methodological approach for 
practical surveys by authors like Cubbin & Leech (1983) and (Zeitlin 1974), and John Scott 
(1991), who participated in the analysis of the corporate control in many of the developed 
market economies. Close results on concentrade ownership show Petranov & Miller (1999).   
On the basis of this approach the main concepts for majority-minority control and the 
whole scale of derivative forms (mechanisms) such as the presence/absence of majority 
shareholder, the presence/absence of a second strong shareholder or group of shareholders in 
the capital of a company, the correlation between the capital in the hands of the biggest (the 
leading) shareholder and the others, and finally the general structure of shareholders’ 
participation are drawn. All of these determine the classification of one or another form of 
corporate control. The whole entity of specific forms of corporate control defines the 
structure of corporate control in a given country. Those criteria, taken not only in their 
temporal development, but in their national specifics, are analyzed in detail in the report. This 
focus of the report is predetermined not only by the scale and the influence of mass 
privatisation, but by the fact that initial dispersion of property was present in the mass 
privatisation, unlike all the other forms which in Bulgaria were based on direct techniques for 
transfer of property in the hands of one buyer. The most significant conclusion presented in 
the report is that the arising concentrated forms of control do not help for the development of 
the stock market in Bulgaria. 
1. Objectives of  Bulgarian Mass Privatisation 
The most popular reason for mass privatisation has always been the willingness to speed 
up the privatisation. In fact, the first privatisation model, called later ‘cash privatisation’ was 
designed with a lot of deficiencies as wrong expectations, e.g. the presumption for quick 
development of the stock market, unnecessary centralization of the procedure, the  improper 
choice of techniques - ‘negotiations with the potential buyers’, even for smaller deals - a time 
consuming ones. All that slowed down the process vastly.  
The second goal stated before mass privatisation was a change in the way the companies 
are being managed. Although, while the poor management of great deal of state enterprises 
                                               
1 The author is grateful to J. G. Backhaus, Maastricht University, Frank H. Steven, Strathclyde University,  
R. Petkova and V. Minchev, Economic Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, for critical comments 
and to R. Dragneva, University of Sussex, UK, for participation in the data preparation. 
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was out of question practically for everybody, it was not quite clear how the mass 
privatisation will influence it. There were expectations, that the change in ownership of 
selected enterprises will have a strong positive effect on the way the enterprises are managed, 
but  there was no going debate - which way the thousands of small new shareholders will 
initiate this radical change; were the privatisation funds (PF) able to perform corporate 
governance and, if yes would this not interfere with their proposed functions as investment 
institutions?  
Apart of this two objectives, some other were launched, as getting social effects from 
mass privatisation, stimulating the development of the middle class and so. A more careful 
look at the process does not allow to classify those statements other way than as a demagogy.  
It makes sense to repeat, that none of pointed goals was ever defended within the whole 
context of a complex economic policy. Contrary, in a very long preliminary period, it became 
clear that mass privatisation has not supporters, but rather has a powerful opponents. And if 
eventually it was carried out, this should be assigned to the fact that its opponents found out 
promising ways for achieving their interests through it. And of course, to the support (and 
pressure) provided by international financial institutions. 
2. Rules and participants 
While the mass privatisation regulation allowed for the individuals to compete with the 
Privatisation Funds (PFs) on an equal basis, in practice they have not acquired any consider-
able influence over the process. Thus, Bulgarian PFs experienced much more power than 
their earlier Czech counterparts.  
PFs were subject to a set of rules following closely the general regulation of investment 
companies with some specifics. Namely, constitution of privatisation funds was subject to 
approval of Commission on Securities and Stock Exchange (CSSE). Granting a license to PF  
was subjected to publishing a prospectus containing an information analogous to that 
concerning an investment company. Later, the funds were allowed to register and trade their 
stock on stock markets as any other investment company. The management, control, 
accountability and information disclosure was also within general investment framework. 
Specifics of PFs’ regulation included the requirement for a minimal level and structure of 
capital, restrictions on their portfolio structure and prohibition for buy back of their stock for 
a 5 years period. Contrary to investment institutions funds were allowed to acquire much 
higher stacks in the companies from their portfolios. The main difference was the option for a 
PF to restructure into a holding company after the auctions. 
The privatisation funds in Bulgaria were registered exclusively as joint-stock companies 
targeted on acquisition, management and trade of shares against the investment bonds in the 
process of mass privatisation.. Investment bonds were distributed among the matured 
Bulgarian citizens on an equal basis and might be traded directly on the auctions or 
contributed into a PF's capital. Against the bonds, PFs were obliged to issue nominated shares 
with voting rights, securing for their investors a classical set of rights on dividend and capital 
gains Any contribution of any sum of bonds by an individual corresponded with the relative 
rise of the funds’ own capital. The Law on PFs prohibited the transfer of  shares acquired in 
mass privatisation for six months after the end of the last privatisation auction. 
There were no restrictions on the subjects establishing privatisation funds, but there were 
a lot of specifics in defining the capital structure. A minimum size of capital was required, 
about 70 ml Bulgarian Leva (BGL), at least 10 ml of which in cash or in securities, and not 
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less than 70 per cent of the capital must be acquired in form of investment bonds received 
from the population. This requirement aimed to ensure that funds were able to complete a 
minimum diversified portfolio securing a higher level for investor’s protection.  
Practically, this requirement became a heavy barrier preventing 11 funds from further 
participation in the process, i.e. about 12 percent of the total number of funds bidding for 
vouchers at the first round.  
From the functional side, on PFs were imposed regulations concerning their investment in 
government securities, real estate, but the most important was that they were allowed to buy 
on the auctions no more than 34% from the stock of any single company privatized out of the 
mass privatisation list. This regulation, said to promote the active securities trade, was 
seriously argued by PFs, which made a lot of efforts to avoid it. 
3. Privatisation Funds founders 
Mass Privatisation's bonds were dispersed among thousands of very small investors 
increasing this way  the role PFs originators. According to the Law on Privatisation Funds the 
founders have had no reserved rights on the account of the other shareholders, so they have 
secured their influence by a number of other mechanisms. First of all, it was demanded that 
the numerous voucher holders should delegate powers to some of the founders for the first 
general meeting. Thus, the founders became entitled to determine almost completely the 
initial management boards. Actually, most of the minor shareholders had never attended these 
meetings. Their opinion was not taken into consideration and they did not, in practice, 
participate in decision taking by founders and managers. Thus, a more detailed study 
becomes necessary about the economic characteristics of PFs' founders. The study 
distinguishes five main groups of founders, typical for the Bulgarian mass privatisation. 
State financial institutions - banks and insurance companies 
The privatisation funds within this category have been organized around financial 
institutions - state-controlled banks and insurance companies. These privatisation funds were 
of the largest ones and enjoyed the confidence to the originating state financial institutions in 
the environment of the crisis in the banking sector. The close relationship between their 
founders and the state promised additional advantages for fast restructuring of the acquired 
enterprises due to possibilities for more specific policy of corporate governance. 
Companies controlled by CEO in privatized companies or by state officials 
That was the second most widespread group of founders - the incumbent managers were 
the most active economic group possessing the economic enterprise in the most sectors. If the 
privatisation funds founded by former directors of enterprises are also added to this group it 
would undoubtedly become the largest one. It was characterized by the dominant personal 
and friendly relationships among the founders who played the primary role at least at the first 
stages of the funds’ activity. 
Private firms with an industry or product specialization  
This was the largest group in terms of the number of participants, but not in terms of the 
accumulated capital. To some extent, it overlapped the above said group of state directors and 
officials who had already established successful business. To a great extent, they tried to 
gather through privatisation a portfolio in which their private firms to act as a core.  
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Private financial institutions 
This group of founders have set the most clear and specific program for investment 
policy. In most cases, they had already established a successful business and their 
privatisation funds were targeted to play a structuring role for their business up to the point 
where a healthier economy will make possible its standard diversification.  
Private financial and economic groups with complex development 
A group of very powerful funding companies with established structures in several 
sectors of economy; sometimes with unclear origin of their capital. They were strongly 
motivated to create holding companies and strengthen their positions in various economic 
sectors.  
Individuals and small firms 
Those founders were the persons who had recently entered the business. In some cases 
they represented larger investors who preferred not to show themselves off at the initial 
phases of privatisation. Another important component were simply active economic persons 
who had often accumulated under their control serious amounts of investment vouchers from 
relatives and friends. 
Table 1 gives an impression about the relative role of those founders in the process of 
acquiring of investment bonds from the citizens. It is clear that, the dominant PFs are those 
created by former (23) or incumbent (19) managers and state officials funds. According to the 
raised capital, they are again the larger groups, though in reverse order. State financial 
institutions created few but very large funds. Not-surprisingly, the smallest number of 
investment bonds was attracted by the physical persons and small firms - only 4% of the total 
PFs' capital. 
Table 1 
Privatisation Funds Founders 
 
State 
financial 
institution
s 
Firms control-
led by CEO/ 
state officials 
Private indu-
stry/product 
based firms 
Private 
financial 
institutions 
Private complex 
financial econo-
mic groups 
Individua
ls and 
small 
firms 
Number of 
PFs 
7 19 23 10 7 15 
Acquired 
capital 
(mln BGL) 
12 113 18 937 13 348 5 475 8 810 2 526 
Source: Privatisation funds prospectuses   
4. Supply side of the process 
It is interesting to know how does the scheme itself favours the creation of active 
corporate control. An analysis is made of what are stakes being offered and what is their 
frequency. According to the scheme, 1,050 enterprises have been offered, out of which 10 
have never been traded. The data relates to the rest 1040 companies. The total size of capital 
of the enterprises offered was 223,795,998 thousand BGL and the medium size of an 
enterprise -  215,188 thousand BGL. 
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Table 2 
Companies Stacks Offered for Mass Privatisation 
Privatised stack Number of enterprises 
Average size of the capital of an enterprise in the 
group (BGL thousand) 
67 % and more 684 96,476 
50 - 66.99 % 53 150,345 
below 50% 303 494,516 
Source: Centre for Mass Privatisation 
The shares offered in the scheme have varied within the broad limits from 10 to 90 
percent, and at least 10 percent have always been provided for restitution claims. They should 
not be viewed as shares changing the ownership concentration, although there were probably 
cases where these shares might unite with another existing large investor and influence the 
picture. Nevertheless, they were not related directly to the results of mass privatisation. 
It seems that this arrangement of the privatisation scheme strove at several goals:  
 to offer shares that would result in formation of a categorical modes/s of control in 
the enterprises; this purpose, however, combined with 34 percent restriction, has been 
realized in a very strange way; 
 to keep large stacks for cash privatisation, thus allowing again emergence of a 
strategic (i.e. most frequently majority) shareholder; to keep at minimum the number 
of companies whose offered stack may result in competing minor models of corporate 
control; 
 the striven forms of control is envisaged to emerge from the mass scheme mainly for 
the smaller companies, for the bigger ones it is expected to come out from other 
(supposedly cash).  
5. Ownership and Control 
5.1. Some methodological notes  
The present study follows an approach offered by J. Scott in a comprehensive 
comparative survey of the corporate structure of companies in Great Britain, USA and Japan. 
Scott (1986) brings out the following forms of corporate governance - control by public 
authorities (predominantly the state through its various ministries and agencies); 'wholly' 
owned companies; a special type of control in mutual and friendly societies; exclusive 
majority control; shared majority; exclusive minority; shared minority; limited minority and 
control exercised via constellation of interests. The paper presents those forms in Bulgarian 
economy, excluding the first three which are irrelevant to the presented study, using Scott's 
taxonomic criteria more or less adapted to fit the local specifics whenever needed.  
Scott further insists, that “the control status of an enterprise can be known only trough a 
detailed investigation of the capital, commercial, and personal relations in which it is 
enmeshed” (Scott 1986, 48). The present study applies this approach with some limitations; it 
follows the latter in analyzing the controlling role not only of the largest shareholder, but also 
the presence of other substantial interests in the capital; it also accepts a more flexible cut-
offs and case-by-case decisions for classification of the marginal cases. At the same time, the 
analysis of the other relations between the shareholders is more limited. In fact it was not 
possible to perform analysis on the interlocking directorship etc.  
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Although another kind of coordinated activities among the funds was traced. The 34% 
ceiling for the size of an acquired stack impelled PFs to form 'couples' - two funds conclude a 
preliminary agreement to participate for blocks of two enterprises. Thus, they acquire one 
block for themselves and one for the partner fund. Subsequently, they exchange mutually the 
governance or ownership on the ‘ordered’ blocks, adding ‘their own blocks’, i.e. by 
increasing their size up to the required value for control. Since the ‘own’ block is tending in 
principle towards the upper limit permitted by the law, the size of the ‘ordered’ block might 
be smaller and vary - 17% is a typical case for it. Totally, they constitute the classical 51% 
required for majority control. Since those 'couples' were never openly announced, their 
existence is a hypothetical. Numerous assertions about such 'couples' appeared during the 
privatisation process, but, naturally, they could not be confirmed. A much more reliable 
criterion is the observation of cases of joint participation of two funds in the capital of a 
single enterprise.  
Table 3 contains the results of this test, grouped by the number of cases. Availability of a 
'couple' is assumed where more than five cases of joint privatisation of enterprises had 
occurred. Of course, it is not claimed that the test is comprehensive. In practice, traced out 
were all incidents only for the combination of a 'largest-second largest' shareholder, some 
cases of a 'major-third' shareholder, and individual combinations of a 'second-third' 
shareholder in the capital of a given enterprise. In those 18 'couples' are represented over 30 
percent of all funds. One can suppose with certainty, however, that the all combinations 
exceed that figure and also include in several cases triangular configurations ('triples') when a 
large PF has concluded an agreement with more than one partner.  
Table 3 
'Couples' of Privatisation Funds in the First Round of Mass Privatisation 
'Couples' 11 2 5 
Number of joint participa-
tion's of a 'couple' 
5 to 10 privatized firms 10 to 15 privatized firms Over 15 privatized firms 
Source: Author’s calculations, Centre for Mass Privatisation 
The presence of 'couples' allows to treat the shares acquired by two funds as an unified 
block for classifying the form of control in a given enterprise. This approach seems rather 
justified in general, since after privatisation, PFs did, in fact, legalize these blocks through 
block transaction on the stock exchange, though in any particular firm's capital there could be 
doubts about the rightness of decision to accept or reject availability of a 'couple. 
The data in Table 4 showing the size of privatized stack reveal not only that offered in the 
list but also some unsold shares distributed proportionally to the stacks acquired by the 
successful bidders; that was regulated by the law and concerned marginal unsold packages2. 
Up to the ten percent stacks reserved for free distribution among the workers are also added 
                                               
2 The packages less than 5% of the capital of the privatised enterprise or less than 25 thousand shares. In 
some cases this resulted in slight increase of the maximum allowed ceiling (34 percent) of shareholding of 
privatisation funds 
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as acquired by the individual participants3. This size of privatized stacks is refereed bellow as 
to the final privatized stacks.  
The most serious methodological problem is related to the application of criteria for the 
individual groups. Despite of the specifying and adapting of these criteria to the specific 
nature of the Bulgarian mass privatisation, there remained very complicated cases which can 
hardly be classified according to the groups of corporate governance. For that reason, this 
study has selected a principle in accordance of which all intermediate or contradictory cases 
are related in conformity with corporate governance typical for a given group, nevertheless 
that this leads in some cases to contradiction with the formal quantitative criteria for the 
group. Besides these peculiarities, there are also other specific features related to the 
peculiarities of the process itself, that are discussed in details hereinafter. 
5.2. Results 
Table 4 presents the newly emerged structure of various forms of corporate governance 
as a result of the mass privatisation scheme. With a view of drawing a comprehensive 
picture, the enterprises with an undefined form of corporate governance have to be 
eliminated. Thus, the final summarizing result is: the share of enterprises where corporate 
governance is manifested in its most strongly concentrated form - exclusive majority, reached 
34.49 percent of all defined forms; the share of enterprises with shared majority control is 
18.53 percent. Exclusive minority is observed in 20.46 percent of the cases, shared minority - 
in 16.86 percent, limited minority - in 3.47 percent, and, finally, corporate governance 
exercised through ‘constellation of interests’ - in 6.18 percent. 
Several proclivities could be outlined on the background of these results. First of all, there 
is categorical preponderance  of the concentrated forms of ownership and governance. It is 
also taken into consideration that a serious number of firms that have remained undefined due 
to the low privatized stake under the scheme, have de facto also acquired similar forms of 
control. With the concentrated forms of control, a shareholder (group) has the possibility to 
exercise maximum control over the activity of the firm’s managers. The observation that in a 
serious number of cases top managers of privatisation funds take part in their governance is 
also made on these lines. This peculiarity is also manifested as preponderance of the majority 
over the minority forms, and as preponderance of the exclusive over the shared control. 
An impressive point is the weak presence of the forms of dispersed shareholder 
ownership where the minor shareholders are playing real role in corporate governance. On 
the other hand, they are presented in all privatized enterprises. The case in point is not only 
about the individual shareholders but also the numerous funds that hold minority positions in 
the enterprises. At the same time, the concentrated forms of control are, as a rule, of a smaller 
size than the enterprises with shared forms of control. This is natural to some extent since the 
ownership concentration is easier to achieve in smaller enterprises. On the other hand, it 
                                               
3 Since each enterprise has managed the subscription itself, the only control on the actual number of 
subscribed shares was the privatised share of the enterprise’s capital at the auctions. It was  accepted that in the 
cases where it was equal or less than the announced share minus 10 percent for free shares, this option was 
performed to a full extent. Thus, the aggregate share of individual participants is increased by the maximum ten 
percent. In the cases where the actually privatised share at the auctions was higher, i.e. the quota for free 
participation was obviously not exhausted, the increase of the share of the individual participants was equal to 
the size of this non-performance. 
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reflects, however, the presence of striving to evade shareholding in an enterprise where a 
dominating interest is present. This striving is explainable to some extent, given the 
insufficient protection of minority shareholders by the legislation. It also reflects, however, 
the dominating notion among the shareholders of the way of participating in corporate 
governance over the enterprises - either all or nothing.  
Table 4 
Ownership and Corporate Control in Mass Privatised Companies 
 Exclusive 
Majority 
Control 
Shared 
Majority 
Control 
Exclusive 
Minority 
Control 
Shared 
Minority 
Control 
Limited 
Minority 
Control 
Control by 
Constellation 
of Interests 
Undef. 
Control by 
Mass Priv. 
Companies  
- number 
- % from the all  
 
267 
26 
 
143 
13.75 
 
159 
15 
 
131 
12,6 
 
27 
2.6 
 
48 
4.6 
 
264 
25 
Capital ('000'BGL) 
-total in the group 
-average per co 
-median of group 
 
19,574,018 
73,311 
43,764 
 
21,509,043 
150,413 
65,296 
 
11,448,649 
72,004.08 
37,319 
 
22,467,420 
171,507 
95,400 
 
2,788,176 
103,266 
51,897 
 
830,798 
17,308 
10,157 
 
153,610,012 
581,856 
- 
Average final 
privatized stack of a 
company (%) 
 
78.05 
 
70.57 
 
73.55 
 
60.10 
 
69.67 
 
82.44 
 
19.94 
Average stakes in a 
company (%) 
-of the “couple”  
-only of leading PF 
-only of  2nd PF 
 
 
59.00 
33.48 
25.53 
 
 
52.32 
32.94 
19.38 
 
 
41.36 
31.22 
8.58 
 
n.a.* 
29.41 
10.99 
 
n.a.* 
14.51 
9.23 
 
0.02** 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
8.14 
1.33 
-of the 3rd PF 
-sum of 3rd,4th, 5th  
-sum of all small st. 
3.54 
3.87 
15.18 
5.12 
6.00 
12.25 
1.57 
1.84 
31.91 
5.86 
7.36 
12.30 
5.55 
9.46 
36.15 
 
 
82.42 
 
 
10.00 
* not applicable 
** all institutional investors 
Source: Centre for Mass Privatisation 
To achieve an overall idea of the nature of the corporate governance structure in Bulgaria 
we need to place it against the structure of a developed market economy. In this case we can 
do that with the data about 250 corporations from Great Britain presented in J. Scott's survey. 
Since it comprises several forms of corporate governance, unfamiliar to Bulgaria or falling 
out of the forms brought forth by mass privatisation, data was re-figured only for the forms 
being common for both countries. While, such an approach to the problem is hiding a certain 
incompatibility4 of data, they might serve as a guiding point for the direction of development 
of the Bulgarian economic reform. Scott makes two classifications according to his proposals 
for specifying the groups. It is believed that it enjoys broader acceptance within the 
researchers’ community.  
According to it, exclusive majority control is available in 25 companies or in 10 percent 
of the cases, shared majority control - in 6 percent of the cases, exclusive minority control - 
in 14.4 percent, shared minority control - in 4.4 percent, limited minority control - in 1.6 
percent, and a constellation of interests is available in 40 percent of the cases. The remaining 
percentage up to 100 are held by forms being not typical for Bulgaria, such as mutual funds 
or solely or state-controlled firms that are not a subject of our survey. The two sets of data are 
plotted in the Chart 1. 
                                               
4
 The actual reason for this incomparableness is in the difference of the legal regulation and still  more in 
the degree of development of corporate relationships in a country in transition such as Bulgaria and in a 
developed country such as Great Britain 
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One can see the enormous preponderance of a heavily dispersed ownership over the 
remaining more concentrated forms of control. It is that very form that imparts the general 
characteristic of the modern British economy and is, at the same time, a subject of 
speculations as to how far the freedom of managers extends. 
In spite of the presence of some analogy  the models, determined by the preponderance of 
the exclusive over the shared forms of control, and certifying to one and the same striving to 
share the control as least as possible, the overall picture is revealing a very significant 
difference. The most significant difference is in the share of the corporate governance forms, 
which is based on the complicated interaction of ‘constellation’ of interests. This heavy 
dispersal of ownership whereupon the largest shareholder does not hold more than ten 
percent of the whole capital of the company, can be efficiently realized only in an 
environment of a developed capital market. There, the efficiency of the managers in 
governance is controlled by increase or decrease of the price of the shares of the company. 
This form is practically absent in Bulgaria, which has a twofold meaning. On the one 
hand, the underdeveloped capital market does not permit the efficient presence of such forms 
of control. On the other one, the lack of diversified shareholders’ ownership does not foster 
active trade with corporate securities. 
6. Capital Market 
When developing the Mass Privatisation Scheme it was expected that it will have a strong 
impact on the development of the capital market. The idea was that given a process of wide 
dispersion of the enterprises' shares, it will create a substantial basis for trade; this was, 
perhaps, embodied in the restriction for maximum share which a PF could acquire in a single 
enterprise. 
The Stock Exchange was re-opened in the beginning of 1998 when a proper, though not 
very sophisticated, regulation was created. The trade is split into an official and free market; 
Corporate Governance Structure in Bulgarian and UK 
Samples of Companies (%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
constellation of interests
limited minority
shared minority
exclusive minority
shared majority
exclusive majority 
Great Britain Bulgaria
Chart  1 
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the former having tree segments "A", "B" and "C". The requirements for listing diminish 
gradually from "A" to the free market. Practically, all listed shares are from Mass Privatised 
firms or PFs, after the restructuring of the latter as holding or investment companies. Part of 
the volume is coming from the sale of state-held stacks, which were thus privatized. The 
latter were mostly minor, though, two cases of transfer of majority packages also occurred.   
The regulation was pretty relax for listing the shares from the mass privatisation which were 
registered for trade 'in mass' in May 1998 on the free market, with few exceptions listed on 
the official market together with the shares of some holding companies 
Chart 2 clearly indicates the two major features of the Bulgarian stock market - the pre-
ponderance of the of free market over the official and the stagnated or even declining trade on 
both markets. The most apparent evidence for the stagnated trade are the figures concerning 
what percent are the monthly turnover volumes of the market capitalization - after a 5 months 
period (Jan-May '98) when it fluctuated about 11%, with a peak of 30% in July '98 those 
index for the official market fell below 1%. The free market follows a similar model - 
fluctuation between 10-20% for the first 7 months of 1998 and bellow 5% in 1999-20005 
picking just in the ends of the years for accounting reasons.  
The third peculiarity of the Bulgarian SE is the huge block trade, when the deals are 
agreed outside the floor of the SE, and the actual trade plays just a registration role. Those 
kind of deals were tolerated to a certain point, since PFs insisted on the opportunity to 
exchange the packages agreed in the process of bidding6 hopping that they will diminish. 
                                               
5 Since, the actual figure for the market capitalisation of the free market is not available 
for the estimation is  used the nominal value of all shares traded in mass privatisation 84.8 
mln BGN. 
6 This is an indirect proof of the justifiability of our 'PFs' couple' hypothesis 
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Although they persisted, after a period (June-Nov 98) of being suspended they started again 
and eventually have been separated on a specific segment of the market. To understand their 
significance it is enough to mention that it's volume for the period Jan98-Apr00 reached 
163,133 thousand BGN, which is 5 times more than the trade on the official market and 87% 
of that on the free market. The latter figure is perhaps even bigger because not all of the block 
trades were announced and recognized as such especially in the beginning of the period. On 
our opinion this trade is the main problem for the Bulgarian stock market, since the transfer 
of the large packages able to affect the control in the respective company aggravated with the 
practice of not paying dividends cause the share prices  to change (often negatively) not 
accordingly to the company's performance. 
As a result, from the more than 1040 companies registered on the market not more than 5 
are traded at least once a week and even in those cases the volumes are low. This way it is not 
possible the share price' dynamic to show the performance of the company and this way to 
play any role in exercising the corporate control. Just the opposite when the latter is 
influenced by the market, i.e. when large stacks, changing the power distribution in a 
company are exchanged through the SE, the result is lowering of the interest of the smaller 
shareholders, as being threaten by further lowering of the prices of their shares.  
Moreover, in many cases when the majority shareholders are strong enough there are 
tendencies to withdraw the company from market trade. This could be illustrated by the 
gradual but steady decrease of the number of the listed companies on the free market - from 
1040 in May'98 - through 848 in June'99 and to 796 in April'00. 
7. Conclusions 
The mass privatisation scheme realized in Bulgaria comprised two possibilities for 
establishing efficient structures of corporate governance. On the one hand, a large number of 
smaller- and medium-size enterprises with high percentage for privatisation have been 
offered. This created prerequisites for their privatisation in a great degree within the process 
itself. On the other hand, mass privatisation made its aim to achieve stronger diversification 
of ownership among a wide circle of investors. This was the line of action of both the 
comparatively limited shares offered for voucher privatisation and the restrictions imposed on 
the institutional participants for the size of their shareholding in an enterprise, as well as the 
very competitive mechanism of this shareholding. In essence, the legal framework defined 
the privatisation funds as investment intermediaries. This repeated, to a great extent, the 
Czech experience and reflected, in the long run, a wider predisposition for creating an active 
capital market. It is inconceivable without a wide dispersal of the trade with shares among the 
medium and small investors as well. In the last reckoning, this was an orientation towards the 
corporate governance structures being exercised through the capital market. 
At the same time, the possibility for transformation of these privatisation funds at a 
certain stage into holding companies has been laid down. Essentially, this is an orientation 
towards such forms of corporate governance where the concentration of the corporate 
governance itself is achieved through concentration of the ownership in a smaller number of 
shareholders. Thus, not only the capital market remains aside, but the governance itself 
acquires a much more direct character. In some cases, the shareholders interfered with the 
operational management of the enterprise. This possibility has probably reflected the 
undeveloped state of the capital market and the objective unfitness of many of the enterprises 
to be traded on it. 
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The survey has shown that the privatisation funds involved themselves to a much greater 
extent in the second opportunity and concentrated corporate governance by various forms of  
agreements yet in the privatisation and later, in transformation into holding companies 
It is difficult to shift the responsibility for this choice to the underdeveloped capital 
market only. Obviously, another circle of reasons related to the undeveloped state of market 
relations, as a whole, in the transitional economies, is laid down in the basis. A similar 
process has also developed in the Czech Republic. Following the initial boom on the stock 
market, the trade has declined to a low level. This issue can be reviewed from another point - 
in essence, the domination of the concentrated forms of corporate governance is a local 
repetition of the global historical development of corporate governance. Its initial forms are 
the direct unity between ownership and governance. Diversifying the ownership among 
numerous agents and complicating, at the same time, its relation with governance, emerges at 
a much later stage when steady and long-term relations among the economic entities are 
established and a strongly developed legal framework allowing the implementation of 
corporate governance through the market is elaborated. 
It is difficult to estimate what is the degree of divergence between the designed corporate 
governance and its actually established structure, and it is even more difficult to define it as a 
failure of the economic policy. The result contains, however, numerous contradictions - on 
the one hand, there is a strong preponderance of concentrated forms of corporate governance 
with their entire inherent definiteness in the approach to both the governance and the 
dividend policy, and in the last reckoning - to the smaller shareholders. On the other one, 
there is an enormous number of public companies, which, apart from being unfit for trading 
on the market, are imposing quire different requirements to the relations between large and 
small owners, to their motivation and, in the long run, to their interest for participation in the 
investment process. 
Realizing these contradictions under which not only the individual but also the 
institutional minority shareholders are in a position of losers, has found expression in the 
numerous proposals for amendments in the legal regulation of the subject of mass 
privatisation. They are mainly aimed at providing a possibility for the small shareholders who 
do not receive any income from their shareholding in the ownership of the privatized 
enterprises, to get rid of it under reasonable terms.  Probably, this is the outcome that will get 
the upper hand in the last reckoning. 
The important question of freezing the capital market, however, is left open. In case of a 
failure even of this attempt to extend the basis of small shareholders, and, thence, of the 
numerous small investors, it would be difficult to predict how the market will be brisked up. 
And under the contemporary conditions when large masses of the population of the 
developed market countries are taking part in the investment processes, either directly or 
indirectly, through the pension and social funds, such encapsulation of the ownership in a 
small number of large shareholders cannot be perceived as an efficient solution of the 
problem.    
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